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Summa Contra Ontologiam
Simone Santini
Escuela Polite´cnica Superior
Universidad Auto´noma de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
and University of California, San Diego, USA
Abstract. This paper is a critical analysis of the concept of ontology thus as it is
used in contemporary computing science. It identifies three main problems with
such a concept, two of which are intrinsic to it and one of which is extrinsic, so
to speak, being related to the use that of ontology is made in applications.
The first problem with ontology is that the only accepted definition of its main
artifact is teleological rather than structural as it would be proper in computing
science. The second problem is that claiming that ontology is in any way a se-
mantic discipline requires such a limited and outdated notion of semantic to be
to all practical purposes useless. The third and final problem is that the limita-
tions and misconceptions of ontology might make it a limiting factor, rather than
a help, for many of the applications for which it is sought.
The article concludes that a profound reconsideration of the relation between
computers and semantics might be overdue.
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper (the lifting-cum-paraphrase of whose title I hope St. Thomas
Aquinas will forgive) is to analyze the foundations and the value (in a rather broad
sense) of what today is commonly known, among researchers and practicioners of in-
formation systems, as ontology. I will make three arguments: the first two will be en-
demic to computing science, while the third will be of a broader nature, touching upon
the relation between the ontological offering of computing science and the disciplines
to which the offer is made. Of the two endemic arguments, the first will be of a formal
nature, viz. the investigation of an acceptable definition of ontology, while the second
is of a more theoretical nature, so to speak, in that it deals with the common assumption
that ontology can be used to formally specify the semantics of a certain domain of dis-
course. This division can be seen, mutatis mutandi, as a mirror of the linguistic division
into which ontology would locate itself: the first section (the one on the definition of
ontology) deals with its syntax; the second section deals with the semantics of ontol-
ogy, and the third with the way ontology is applied in disciplines outside of computing
science, that is, it deals with the pragmatics of ontology. The parallel with the three tra-
ditional levels of linguistics should not be taken too seriously, of course, but it should
be located somewhere between the general guideline and the pure divertissement.
Before taking on these subjects, however, I should like to take a little space to settle,
once and for all, a terminological matter. The word ontology originates in metaphysics
where it is, according to the Britannica,
the study of being as such, i.e. of the basic characteristics of all reality.
Ontology, as defined in metaphysics, is the study of being, not of beings: it is not
a taxonomy of existing things and consequently, for instance, Linneus never claimed
to be doing ontology (and quite correctly so). It is true that John Scot’s De divisionis
Naturae is generally regarded as an ontological work, but this is due to its Platonic
assumption of the universals as the only reality, and not to the taxonomical structure
of the work per se. The word ends with the suffix -logy and, due to the programmatic
rather than methodological connotation of the suffix in this case, it has no plural: there
are no different studies of being as such, but any way of studying it is part of the same
discipline of ontology. The Oxford English Dictionary, quite correctly, doesn’t report
any plural for the word ontology.
In computing, the word ontology is used with two different connotations: as a disci-
pline and as the artifacts that the discipline produces. While the term ontology is usable
(by an admittedly rather daring metaphorical extension) in the first case, as a name for
the artifact it is clearly improper: a better name in this case would be ontonomy (plu-
ral ontonomies)1. In this paper, I will keep the distinction and refer to the discipline as
ontology and to the artifact as ontonomy.
Some readers might see into all this the expression of too fine a pont, an empty
pseudo-intellectualistic annoyance, but I disagree quite emphatically with any such as-
sessment: computing is a mathematical discipline, and precision in the terms that one
uses is of the greatest importance for it, the unwanted connotations of a term often
leading to confusion. Since confusion is precisely what I ascribe the existence of com-
putational ontology to, it is important to try to avoid falling into easy connotational
pitfalls, the risk of pedantry being in any case preferrable to that of imprecision.
2 Syntactic definition of ontology
Given the importance that these days is ascribed to ontology in many areas of infor-
mation management, it is surprisingly hard to come across a mathematically acceptable
definition of the discipline or of its artifacts. The most common definition or, at least,
the one that I hear around the most, is along the following lines:
an ontology is a formalization of a conceptualization.
The most quoted source of this definition appears to be [7], but the definition is
widely accepted (see [12, 2], for example). The problems of this definition are of several
orders, and I will consider some of them in a short while but, for the moment, I would
like to concentrate on the functional nature of it: this definition doesn’t tell us what an
1 Quite surprisingly (to me, at least), this is not a neologism. The term was used in 1803 by J.
Stewart in his Opus Maximum as more or less as synonym of ontology. Given its derivation
from oντoς , (present participle of to be) and νoµια, (distribution, arrangement), I think that
my connotation is better than Stewart’s. A more appropriate name, with less metaphysical
baggage, would be (from oικoς , household) the word economy but, as the readers undoubtedly
know, the term is already used for an altogether different discipline.
ontology is but, rather, what it is (generally) used for. This kind of definition is of course
unacceptable in computing science.
Consider, as a parallel, the definition of formal grammar: if researchers in program-
ming languages had used the same criteria of rigor (or lack thereof) as researchers in
ontology, the definition would sound something such as:
a formal grammar is the specification of a programming language.
But this is unacceptable: for one thing, while computing scientists do use formal
grammars in order to formalize programming languges, there is no reason why this
should be their only use. Linguists (at least those adhering to the Chomskyan current
of the Anglo-American philosophy of language) use it to describe parts of natural lan-
guage, and there is no reason why other uses should not be found. Finding new uses will
not change the nature of the artifact, but will invalidate functional definitions such as the
one given above. A functional definition describes the use of an artifact, but it doesn’t
specify its nature and structure, how we can identify it: given an arbitrary string of sym-
bols, a definition should allow one to determine whether the string is a formal grammar
or not. To this end, a structural definition is necessary. In the case of formal grammar,
the definition is the well known one: a formal grammar is a 4-tuple (N,T, S, P ), where
N is a finite set (called the set of non-terminals), T is a finite set, disjoint fromN (called
the set of terminals), etc.
With this definition, one can proceed to define the language recognized by the gram-
mar, and its properties. In the case of ontology, with very few exceptions, a structural
definition is not provided: researchers are building a huge edifice on a formal struc-
ture without knowing what that structure is. Artificial intelligence does indeed have a
definition of ontonomies but, in that case, an ontonomy is defined as the collection of
all symbols used in a logic system, with the indication of which names are functions,
which are predicates, and which are constants [10]. There is nothing wrong with this
definition, but it certainly bears little resemblance to what the information system on-
tologists are doing. In particular, this definition doesn’t include any relation between
the terms and doesn’t lay any semantic claim.
* * *
Many researchers in information systems are blissfully unaware of the fact that
they are building such an enormous edifice on such weak foundations, but not all. One
interesting attempt at a formal foundation of ontology has been made by Guarino [8].
Guarino’s starting point is the notion of intensional relation. Consider a relation such
as [above](x, y) (which contains all pairs x, y such that x is above y). One can consider
a set of objects, say a, b, c, and d, and create a relation, say
[above] = {(a, b), (a, d), (b, d)} , (1)
which states that a is above b and d, and b is above d. This definition makes the con-
cept “above” dependent on the specific configuration of a, b, c, and d: if b were above
a, instead of a being above b, the relation would change. This extensional notion of
“aboveness” is in this sense unsatisfactory: the concept of one thing being above an-
other should be independent of the particular world configuration that we are analyzing.
Guarino solves this insufficiency by introducing the notion of intensional relation.
Let D be a set of elements. An n-ary relation on D is a subset of Dn and therefore
2D
n
is the set of all n-ary relations on D. Let W be a set of worlds, that is, grosso
modo, a set of legal configurations of the elements ofD. An intensional relation r is an
assignment, to each possible world in W , of a relation (n-ary, in this example) on D,
that is, an intensional relation is a function
r : W → 2Dn . (2)
So, given a world w in which a is above b and nothing else is above anything, we would
have
[above](w) = {(a, b)} . (3)
Given a logical language L(V ) built on a vocabulary V , an extensional model for
L(V ) is a pair (D,R)—where D is a set, and R a set of relations on D—such that V
can be mapped to D and predicates of L to elements of R. Similarly to this standard
definition, Guarino defines an intensional model for a language by replacing R with
a set of intensional relations. An intensional model for L(V ) can be seen then as a
function that maps any possible world w to an extensional model relative to that world.
This intensional interpretation of a language is also called an ontological commit-
ment. An ontonomy (my term, of course, not Guarino’s) is then defined as follows:
Given a language L, with ontological commitment K, an [ontonomy] for L is
a set of axioms designed in a way such that the set of its models approximates
as best as possible the set of intended models of L according toK ([8])
There are three ways in which this definition is unsatisfactory, at least as a comput-
ing science theory (some points of the definition have a certain philosophical interest,
but this is besides the point in a computing milieu).
Firstly, the notion of intensional relation is in some way related to the Kripkean no-
tion of possible worlds, but with some important distinguo. In Kripke, possible worlds
are formal models indexed by a variable that corresponds to a degree of modality. A
predicate is true (false) in a world depending on what it predicates about the exten-
sional relation existing in the model corresponding to the degree of modality of that
world. Extensional relations are what determine the essence of the world and, there-
fore, what determines the structure of a model.
In the case of ontology, however, we have to resort to the notion of possible worlds
in order to define extensional relations, which implies that extensional relations can’t be
expressed in the world (if they were, the extensional relations would be logically prior
to the intensional, and the latter could not be used to define the former). But, if this is
the case, no possible world can have any structure, and not only can’t they be used as a
model in the Kripkean sense, but they can’t even induce an extensional relation.
To put it in a different way: given a formal world of blocks, in order to instantiate
the extensional relation [above], one needs to know whether block a is above block b;
but the only way in which this can be known is to check whether (a, b) ∈ [above]:
the worlds, that one needs in order to define the intensional relation, can only have
structure by virtue of the extensional relations that the intensional ones are supposed to
define. We are stuck in the middle of a circular argument. All this does not imply that
intensional relations do not exist, but it does imply that, whetever they are, they are not
a function from worlds to extensional relations, as the model requires.
Secondly, an ontology is defined as a system of axioms that defines (approximately,
but this will be my third point) the set of models of a language L. On one hand, this
definition leaves one with the complete freedom to choose the logic system in which
these axioms are drawn while, on the other hand, it makes an ontonomy dependent on
the choice of the language L. Given this latitude, it is not clear whether this definition
defines anything worth defining. In order to dispense with the dependency on the lan-
guage L (which runs quite against the common notion of ontonomy), one could say that
an ontonomy is a system of axioms for which there is a language L such the axioms
define the same set of models as the ontological commitment of L. But, presumably, for
all non-contradictory set of axioms it is possible to define such a language so the defi-
nition would reduce simply to the statement that an ontonomy is any set of statement in
any formal language. Such a definition is formally correct, but it is also so generic as to
be of no use.
Thirdly, we have the presence of the word “approximates.” With this addendum, any
system of statements that admits at least one model that is also a model for a language
L is an ontonomy for L. If we abstract from the language, then any set of statements
that admits at least a model is an ontonomy. In particular, any set of tautologies is an
ontology. Allowing for approximation, in other words, worsens the problem considered
in the previous point: the definition is formally consistent, but too broad to be of any
use: many things, from a C program to a very well structured grocery list, to a tax return
form would qualify.
To this, one should add that Guarino’s definition is not innocent of functionalism:
given a set of statements in a certain logic system the only thing that makes them into
an ontonomy is their intended use: if the statements are used to provide models con-
sistent with an ontological commitment, then they form an ontonomy, otherwise they
don’t. This is not a structural definition of the type that computing science seeks. To
come back to my previous example, given the definition of a grammar, and an arbitrary
string, then one can decide whether the string is a grammar based on structural consid-
erations only, even if one doesn’t know that grammars are used to specify languages.
The definition is structural and, in a sense, closed: it can be checked by making ref-
erence to the definition alone, without any teleological consideration. With Guarino’s
definition of ontonomy such a possibility does not exist.
* * *
A formally correct, structural definition of ontonomy that has been proposed in the
literature is based on the algebraic theory of abstract data type, in particular on the
notion of sub-typing. The theory has been proposed, e.g. by Bench-Capon and Malcom
in [1], and its theoretical presupposition are in Goguen and Meseguer’s order-sorted
algebras [6]. An order-sorted algebra is a multi-sorted algebra (Ω, (Aα|α ∈ S)) where
the set of sorts S is endowed with a partial order relation called the sub-sort relation.
Given a partially ordered set of sort names S = (S,≤), a collectionΣ of types equation
symbols, and a set E of equations on the symbols of Σ, one obtains a order-sorted
equational theory T = (S, Σ,E). IfD is a model of T , then call (T,D) a data domain.
If we have a set of classes with attributes, Bench-Capon and Malcom use the sorts
of the order-sorted equational theory to model the attributes, a data domain to model
the attribute values, and a separate order model to model the classes:
Definition 1. An ontology signature is a triple (D, C, A), where D = (T,D) is a data
domain, C = (C,≤) is a partial order, called a class hierarchy, and A is a family of
sets Ac,e of attribute symbols for c ∈ C and e ∈ C + S, where S is the set of sorts in
T . The family is such that Ac′,e ⊆ Ac,e′ whenever c ≤ c′ and e ≤ e′2.
An ontonomy is then simply a pair (Σ,A), whereΣ is an ontology signature and A
a set of axioms. A model of such an ontonomy is a model of Σ that satisfies the axioms
of A.
While this is a rigorous structural definition, it has the problem of reducing ontology
to the specification of a type system whose components are structures3. The basic rela-
tion between types here is the sub-typing relation (the partial order ≤ among classes),
while all other relations have to be introduced as attributes. In other words, this model
is strongly oriented towards monocriterial taxonomies, although it is more general than
a simple taxonomy in that it allows the classification structure to be a partial order (viz.
a directed acyclic graph) rather than a tree. It is, in other words, too limited a definition
to cover the uses that are being done of the idea of ontology: while the theory can serve
as the foundation of a discipline of ontology, it is too weak to provide a sound basis to
the current uses of the notion.
Even with all these defects, the model of Bench-Capon and Malcom has the clear
advantage of providing the type of definition necessary for computing science, without
resorting to unacceptable teleological notions. To the best of my knowledge this is, to
this date, the most promising attempt at a definition of an ontonomy, and the one most
likely to be eventually extended to an acceptable definition.
3 Ontology and semantics
While a correct structural definition is still very elusive (and while most practicioners
seem blissfully unaware of—or unconcerned by—the problem), there is a general con-
sensus that ontology is somehow involved with the semantics of an information system,
that ontonomies, whatever their structural definition will turn out to be, contain con-
cepts and relations between them. The idea is not immediately obvious: ontonomies
contain symbols, not unlike any formal system (or not unlike any data base, for that
matter), and one should wonder what makes the symbols contained in an ontonomy be
2 [1].
3 Bench-Capon and Malcom call these elements “classes,” but they should not be confused with
the classes used in object oriented models: the classes of this model are not abstract, since their
attributes are explicitly declared.
concepts. This question constitutes the semantic problem of ontology, which I propose
to discuss in this section.
It is worth reminding that, when we are talking about semantics in the context of
ontology, we are talking about something very different than, say, the semantics of
a programming language. In programming languages, semantics is simply a function
from states to states of a certain abstract machine. In ontology, the semantic that is
modeled is supposed to be the semantics of the group in which the system is inserted,
that is, the relation between the data in an information system and the symbols of an
ontology is supposed to be isomorphic to the signification relation between signifier
and signified in human culture. So, while the development of a theory of programming
language semantics doesn’t require any cognitive endorsement, the assertion that there
is a computational discipline of ontology requires the endorsement of a theory of signi-
fication. Unlike programming language semantics, information system semantics (and
ontology with it) is not theoretically innocent, so to speak.
If we take the rather general view that an ontonomy is a set of symbol and of re-
lations between them then, with respect to the problem of meaning, one might ask
whether these relations are constitutive or not. A negative answer leads to an atomism
a´ la Fodor, while a positive answer leads to a point of view resembling very much what
Fodor himself calls inference roˆle semantics. I will begin by assuming that the answer
is negative, that is that conceptual atomism is the theory of choice.
* * *
The possibility that symbols signify “by themselves” that is, independently of the
relations between them requires the endorsement of a very strong form of conceptual
atomism found, as far as I can tell, only in Fodor’s informational semantics:
Informational semantics denies that “dog” means dog because of the way it
is related to other linguistic expressions [...]. Correspondingly, informational
semantics denies that the concept DOG has its content in virtue of its position
in a network of conceptual relations4.
Note that the “correspondingly” here requires a fairly important metaphisical invest-
ment since it maps conceptual structures to linguistic ones. This, passim, is the same
investment that ontology requires when it takes a linguistic structure (constituted of
words and relations) and calls it a conceptual model.
Informational semantics has to struggle hard to eradicate itself from radical na-
tivism: by the account of representational theories of mind, only composed concepts
can be acquired (through inference from their components), thus conceptual atomism
seems to imply that all concepts are innate. For Fodor, acquiring a concept means “get-
ting nomologically locked to the property that the concept represents”5 but the way to
acquire a concept is having the right kinds of experiences. So, if one doesn’t want to
throw away the conceptual atomism baby together with the radical nativism bath water,
4 [3], p. 73.
5 ibid. p. 125, emphasis in the original.
the problem that one faces is “why is it so often experience with doorknobs, and so
rarely experience with whipped cream or giraffes, that leads one to lock to doorknob-
hood?”6
Explanations that rely on hypothesis testing turn out to deny atomism, so they can’t
be applied. Fodor’s solution to this problem is to stipulate that doorknobhood is con-
stituted by how its strikes us, viz. “being a doorknob is having the property that minds
like ours come to resonate to in consequence to relevant experience with stereotypical
doorknobs”7
The serious flaw of this notion is that, since it needs to avoid any oppositional or
structural definition of meaning in order to save atomism, it can’t take into account
the dependence of a single concept on the way in which different cultures divide the
semantic field. To stay on Fodor’s example, the English words “doorknob” and “door
handle” correspond (roughly) to the Italian words “pomello” and “maniglia.” But the
areas covered by these concepts are not the same: while pomelli are, in general, door-
knobs, some of the things that English speakers call doorknobs would qualify, for the
Italian, as maniglie. The schema is more or less the following:
doorknob
doorhandle
maniglia
pomello
Why is it then that Italian minds “resonate” with doorknobs differently than English
minds? By Fodor’s account, there must be something different between English and
Italian minds. A consequence of the consumption of wine and olive oil?
It appears, in other words, that we can’t give a sensible explanation of the difference
between doorknobs and pomelli unless we consider them differentially and opposition-
ally in the context of their respective languages. Doorknob is not a positive term, but
serves to establish a distinction, an opposition in the semantic field of a language. Dif-
ferent languages break the semantic field in different ways, and concepts arise at the fis-
sures of these divisions. Consider, as an example, the way in which adjectives of old age
are constituted in Italian, Spanish and French8. The basic adjective, vecchio/viejo/vieux
is applied both to things and to persons. There are specific forms, however: in Spanish,
an˜ejo is an appreciative form used mainly for alcoholic beverages (un ron an˜ejo). The
Italian adjective anziano applied mainly to people, and the correspondence is roughly
anziano/anciano/aˆge´, but anziano has a broader meaning that the other two adjectives,
being used in expressions such as “il sergente anziano” to denote seniority in a function,
a situation in which the Spanish would use antiguo and the French ancien. Note that the
Spanish also has the possibility of using the word mayor as a softer and more respectful
6 ibid. p. 127
7 ibid. p. 137, emphasis in the original.
8 I am taking this example, with some adaptation, from [5].
form of denoting a person of old age, while the corresponding Italian and French words
are never used in this sense. The correspondence is, in other words, according to this
schema
Italian Spanish French
an˜ejo
vecchio viejo vieux
anziano anciano aˆge´
mayor
antiguo ancien
antico antique
Here too, in order to save atomism and the nomological relation between concepts
and world that goes with it, one should explain why it is that Italian, Spanish, and French
minds resonate differently with age and, this, of course, by making reference only to the
relation between individual concepts and the state of affairs in the world: differential or
oppositional explanations related to the semantic field are not allowed by atomism.
At the origin of these problems there is, among other things, a certain confusion that
computational ontologists have been known to make between signification and designa-
tion: the general idea in ontology seems to be that A means B if and only if A designates
B. It is important however to keep the distinction between the two and, for this, I will
just consider a famous example from Husserl ([9], p. 47): the winner at Jena/the loser
at Waterloo. We notice that the meaning of tehse two phrases is different, although their
designatum is the same: Napoleon.
Designation is a relation between a linguistic plane and an extra-linguistic one, but
signification is a purely linguistic relation. That is, pace Fodor, meaning is not a nomo-
logical relation between mind and world, but a collection of relations and oppositions
within the language.
* * *
These facts point quite strongly away from atomism that is, away from the (admit-
tedly naı¨ve) hypothesis that a symbol in an ontonomy possesses meaning qua symbol,
by virtue of its name alone, without reference to the other elements of the ontonomy9.
We are thus led to considering the second hypothesis given in the opening of this
section, namely that the relations that one finds in an ontonomy are constitutive of
meaning. Consider, for instance, the following ontonomy:
car v motorvehicle u roadvehicle u ∃size.small
pickup v motorvehicle u roadvehicle u ∃size.big (4)
motorvehicle v ∃uses.gasoline
roadvehicle v ∃4has.wheels
9 This is not conceptual atomism a´ la Fodor, which is all but naı¨ve, but the naı¨ve interpretation
that of it has been given in computing science.
The meaning of the word ”car” is not given here by the juxtaposition of the three letters
/c/, /a/, and /r/, but by its (structural) relation with the terms ”motorvehicle,” ”roadvehi-
cle,” ”size,” and ”small,” together with the relation of these terms with other terms and
so on. In other words, one can say that the meaning of the word ”car” is given by the
following structure
D v B u C u ∃ρ3.F
E v B u C u ∃ρ3.G (5)
B v ∃ρ1.A
C v ∃4ρ2.H
which we can represent by the following diagram
A
ρ1
B
@@
@@
@@
@ C
~~
~~
~~
~
ρ2(4)
H
F Dρ3 E
ρ3
G
(6)
The meaning of the word “car” is to be found in the structure of this definition that is,
essentially, in the following diagram:
·
·
==
==
==
= ·




·
· · · ·
(7)
Replacing D with ”car” in (6), we obtain the structural meaning of the concept
CAR. (Here I am using capitalization to denote concepts and words in quotes to denote
linguistic entities; a Saussurean semiotician would say that ”car” is a signifier and CAR
the corresponding signified.)
The problem with the position that the structure (6) is the meaning of the word ”car”
(that is, to be completely clear, that (6) is CAR) comes from the following structure:
dog v animal u quadruped u ∃size.small
horse v animal u quadruped u ∃size.big (8)
animal v ∃ingests.food
quadruped v ∃4has.leg
which is isomorphic to (6), that is, to CAR. Unless one is ready to concede that CAR
= DOG (and I expect quite a few people to object to this identification on ground of
affection either toward their poodle or toward their BMW), one must admit that there is
something wrong in our definition.
The structural definition of meaning can be saved, in this circumstance, by noticing
that quadrupeds are animals, while road vehicles are not necessarily motor vehicles (a
horse-drawn cart, a small omnibus, or one of those four wheels bicycles that are often
rented out at seaside resorts are examples of road vehicles with four wheels but no
engine) so, in (8) we can affirm
quadruped v animal (9)
and change the first two relations to
dog v quadruped u ∃size.small (10)
horse v quadruped u ∃size.big (11)
If this new structure is still not enough to differentiate between different concepts, we
can add more predicates. The question is: when can we stop? The answer is that we
can’t: if meaning is in the structure (and we have already ruled out the hypothesis that
meaning is in the symbols themselves), then the meaning of a sign is given by the trace
on it of all the other signs of the language, and no part of the system can self-sustain
once detached from the whole.
* * *
But even an hypothetical (and impossible) macrostructure containing the whole lan-
guage and its lexical relations would not be sufficient to save the semantic programme
of ontology: the ontological meaning would still be normative, the codification of an
author’s intention at the time the text was written, and would omit the essential active
roˆle of the reader in the construction of meaning. In order to maintain the possibil-
ity of recording meaning once and for all, ontology must anchor it to a pre-linguistic
intentional act of the author: reconstructing meaning means reconstructing this inten-
tional status. The only way in which ontology can keep a stable meaning is by constant
policing and an authoritarian normativism that sets, once and for all, the ’true’ inten-
tions of the author. There is no social participation in this construction of meaning: the
reader can be replaced by an algorithm. To the Barthesian death of the author, ontol-
ogy opposes a drastic “death of the reader.” The underlying philosophy here is that of
signification as a market, an old pre-structuralist view associated with the bourgeois in-
dividualism: meaning belongs to the author like a commodity, and language is just the
currency that allows one to exchange this meaning-commodity with someone who is
also an owner of meaning. But it is unlikely that such a privately owned, pre-linguistic
intentional act may exist: meaning arises in language, and it is a product of a shared
system of signification. What can be articulated and understood depends on this shared
code. One can no longer see an intentional act that pre-dates language and that language
simply reflects (the essentialist view of the ontologists notwithstanding). Reality, and
the writing subject, are the product of language. And just as language interacts with
other social and cultural systems, so does the act of reading. It is reading—historically
and conceptually situated—that constructs meaning connecting the cues that the text
gives with the complex network of conventions, discourses, and situatedness in which
it occurs.
Consider a sign on a door that says “trespassers will be prosecuted.” The context
necessary to understand this sign is considerable. I must understand, for instance, that
this sign is not informative in the sense that a newspaper headline is: I am not being
informed that there have been trespassers somewhere and that they will be prosecuted
sometime in the future: in western societies at least, information of this kind is not
written on signs hanging from doors, especially if we see that the sign is made of plastic
or wood (and therefore is durable) and the writing is not dated. Such a sign typically is
a threat, the word “trespasser” refers to me (the reader) in case I decide to walk through
the door, and it threatens me of prosecution if I do so. The threat also implies that
prosecution is likely to result in punishment. I must understand that trespassing in this
context means to cross this door, not some door in the palace of the king of Siam. I have
to have a general knowledge of private property to understand that preventing people
from entering into a building is one of the rights that society grants to proprietors (while,
for instance, preventing people from looking at the building is in general not such a
right), that there are authorities that will guarantee the respect of these rights, and that
they will punish people who infringe these rights, that the sign has been placed there
with their tacit approval, and so on...
None of these elements, necessary for understanding, is in the text: they must be
supplied by a specific situation. The text here takes meaning by being situated (viz.
placed in a situation: a door on a building rather than, say, a shelf on a store that sells
signs) and in a certain relation with other texts that are not present, namely the political
discourse that regulate private property, the speech through which certain customs have
been implanted in the reader, and so on. Finally, all this linguistic discourse rests on
a substratum of human practices and action: the political relation of power between
authority and citizens, and the fact that in order to understand punishment one must
understand pain (psychological pain, at least).
There is more to meaning, in other words, than just relations between terms: the
creation of signification is a back-and-forth process between the text and the reader; the
reader, influenced by the text, creates a frame of reference in which the text itself can
be given meaning. This is what Gadamer [4] called the hermeneutic circle: the parts
of the text can be understood in terms of the whole context, and the context becomes
intelligible by means of the parts.
Ontology is trying to break this circle by removing the reader from it: it removes
the creative act of the reader and tries to encode the essence of the meaning in such a
way that it can be read without interpretation.
In this, it falls into the trap of believing that a text is just an author’s intended mean-
ing, and that therefore it is possible to re-code the text leaving the meaning unaltered.
But if the meaning arises through an historically situated interaction of the reader with
the text, then the text is the only possible closure of the hermeneutic circle, the only
possible representation of itself, and changing the code will change the meaning. There
is, in other words, no objective, essential or immutable meaning that can be encoded,
either through ontological or other means in such a way that its interpretation will not
require the active, culturally and historically situated, participation of the reader.
4 The pragmatics of ontology
The previous section suggested quite decisively and conclusively that the abmitious se-
mantic programme of ontology is unattainable. Yet, as we all know, ontonomies are
eagerly sought after, to the point of being hailed as a cornerstone of the constituenda
semantic web. It is interesting to question why this is the case. A full answer to this
question would require investigating in some depth the sociology of the computing en-
terprise and its relation with other economic forces, and analysis that is in the absolutest
terms beyond the scope of this paper. I will venture only the briefest of comments.
The view of meaning as a commodity and of signification as a market transaction fit
quite well, of course, with certain commercial aspects of the web, and it is no surprise
that, in an age in which intellectual property rights are expanded to levels never dreamt
before, a view of signification that allows the commodification of meaning (and thus,
potentially, its patentability) should be regarded with more than a passing interest in the
semantic web area. It is, in other words, not a surprise that the semantic web is these
days probably the more fertile ground for the application of ontology.
It is also not surprising that the idea that meaning is to be sought in a series of
taxonomies (naı¨ve as it might be) should have arisen in an environment close to the
programming profession, where taxonomies have been popularized as a programming
discipline by object oriented methods: a lot of the ontological vocabulary, especially
in the vicinity of the semantic web, shows a definite debt to that of the programming
profession. Of course, the wide adoption of a taxonomy in a certain discipline tends to
confine the discourse around certain terms an to establish an orthodoxy which might
stifle alternative discourses: whether this is useful depends on the status of the disci-
pline. The taxonomy of Linneus was a great help to the relatively mature discipline
of zoology, but the taxonomization of all the elements into air, water, fire, and earth
contributed to the failure of the Greek to develop a science of nature. Given the perva-
siveness of computers, and the social pressure to use them, the terms and taxonomies
that they impose tend to become strong norms. By forcing computerized data bases,
normative semantics, and taxonomies on a vital but not yet settled discipline we might
take away its vitality more than help it.
5 Conclusions
Semantics (in the sense of information systems semantics) seems to have become a most
powerful “buzz-word” in the computing profession (a profession that is becoming, alas,
very responsive to hype and word clout), and ontology seems occasionally to ascend to
the status of a panacea. But, from within the point of view of computing science, there
are at least two serious problems with this panacea.
The first is that, while we appear eager to use ontonomies in the most diverse appli-
cations, we are quite unable to define them with precision. More than a specific onto-
logical problem, this issue is a symptom of a preoccupying relaxation of the standards
of rigor of computing and, as such, should not be taken lightly, even from researchers
not directly connected with ontology.
The second problem is in the idea of semantics to which ontology makes reference,
an idea that is clearly insufficient in the light of all that is known about the process of
signification. In a sense, the choice of such a model of signification reveals a certain
cultural autism, so to speak, of computing science, and a certain historical arrogance.
The problem of signification has been studied at least since the debate between the
Stoics and the Epicureans on the nature of the sign, has been an important concern
in medieval philosophy, and has been absolutely central in the philosophy of the XX
century. But, faced with the problem of signification, computing scientists chose to
disregard all this and to start from zero.
This problem is not specific to computing science, but it appears to be fairly com-
mon among technologists: “High tech, in fact, appears not only as optimistic about the
future but also more indifferent toward and, in other contexts, more manipulative of the
past than earlier technologies have been”10. Computing science is falling here in the
very typical technological fallacy of considering history—cultural history, in this case,
as “irrelevant save as the supposed contrast with the golden age ahead. It is as if high
tech arrived and flourished in an historical vacuum of no more than a few decades and
as if everything before it can simply be forgotten”11. But, of course, to think this way
is illusory. The problem of signification and the viable relations between a syntactic
manipulation device such as a computer and semantics are much more complex than
the simple schematism of ontology would imply.
Given the importance that the presence of computing devices has in the disciplines
in which they are used; given the influence that these devices have in promoting or
constraining certain discourses in these disciplines, the computing profession has the
responsibility of rejecting facile solutions. It has the responsibility of understanding the
different perspectives on semantics, of being aware of the history of such problem and,
ultimately, to re-analyze the relations between computers and the process of significa-
tion. Computers are syntactic machines, and it not immediately obvious that they can
be of any help in dealing with semantics. The problem is worth exploring, but in a more
complex way, without prejudices: the first question should not be how to we use a com-
puter to represent semantics, but whether we should do so. We computing professional
must have the acumen to discover the answer, and the cultural humility to accept it,
whatever it might be.
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